# Does your seed/key actually hold?

> The SecurityAccess engine actively tests UDS service 0x27. It measures seed randomness (constant, zero, low-entropy or incrementing seeds), attempts to recover the seed-to-key algorithm and tries a catalogue of default keys, checks whether a brute-force lockout triggers after wrong keys, and verifies that the ECU enforces the request-seed-then-send-key sequence. An opt-in ECU-reset probe checks whether the seed is predictable across reboots. Every probe is bounded and non-destructive by default; the reset probe is gated behind a confirmation.

AutoST probes UDS SecurityAccess: seed randomness, weak seed-to-key algorithms, default keys, brute-force lockout and sequence enforcement. Bounded and non-destructive.

Source: https://auto-st.com/security-access-testing

SecurityAccess (0x27) is what stands between an attacker and the dangerous services. AutoST checks whether that gate is real: random seeds, a strong key algorithm, a working lockout and an enforced sequence.

## Five ways a seed/key gate fails

### Seed randomness

Flags constant, zero, low-entropy or incrementing seeds, measured over multiple requests.

### Key algorithm

Attempts to recover a weak seed-to-key relationship and tries a catalogue of known default keys.

### Brute-force lockout

Checks whether the ECU locks out after repeated wrong keys, or lets an attacker keep trying.

### Sequence enforcement

Verifies the ECU rejects a key that was sent without first requesting a seed.

### Reset predictability

Opt-in: checks whether the same seed returns after an ECU reset, a sign of clock- or uptime-seeded generation.

### Grounded method

The test cases mirror established research (CaringCaribou for seed randomness, HydraVision for lockout).

## FAQ

**Is this destructive?**

The core probes are bounded and non-destructive. The one exception is the optional ECU-reset predictability probe, which resets the ECU and is therefore gated behind an explicit confirmation.

**What counts as a weak key algorithm?**

If AutoST can derive the key from the seed with a simple transformation, or a default key from a known catalogue unlocks the ECU, the seed/key scheme is reported as weak.

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AutoST by Zyberum. Canonical page: https://auto-st.com/security-access-testing
